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INTRODUCTION
The current method of determining component failure rates
for the purpose of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) used in
the nuclear industry is a straight forward method of taking
the total failures divided by the time over which the failures
occurred whether the data is plant specific or generic.  This
comes from the usual classical statistics estimate obtained
under a Poisson model (maximum likelihood estimator).  This is
the method utilized in the references used by Portland General
Electric in their individual plant examination study.  The
references will be discussed in the process of the study.  The
method proposed in this study is the reliability growth method
and involves taking into account the fact that the amount of
failures per additional year of operation generally decreases
yearly because the operational staff becomes familiar with the
equipment.  The reliability growth method will result in lower
component failure rates which when used in PRA studies could
result  a  lower  core  melt  frequency  value.  This  also
introduces a time dependency to the component failure rate
determination.  The component failure rate would be expected
to be higher in the early stages and should gradually decrease2 
as time goes on.  This study will compare the final core melt
frequency of the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant based on data
developed using both methods.3 
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT
In order to gain a better perspective of the reliability
growth study performed at Oregon State University a brief
history of probabilistic risk assessment as it pertains to the
nuclear industry is warranted.  The following history will
cover the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400), Guide to the
Performance of PRA (NUREG/CR-2300) and PSA Procedure Guide
(NUREG/CR-2815).
The Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400)
The Reactor Safety Study'  which started in 1972 and was
completed  in  1975  was  the  first  attempt  to  perform  a
probabilistic risk assessment on the nuclear power industry.
The study was commissioned by the United States Atomic Energy
Commission.  The study was directed by Dr. Norman C. Rasmussen
of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and performed by
engineers and scientists from various backgrounds including
the Atomic Energy Commission,  the national laboratories,
private laboratories, and universities.  The initial goal of
the study was to try to reach some meaningful conclusions
about the risks of nuclear accidents using the technology
available at that time.  At the start there were many doubts
of the uncertainties involved with the study since it was the
first of its kind.  It would turn out that even though the4 
uncertainties were large compared to the technology available
today, this study resulted in uncertainties which were much
smaller than initially believed possible.
As the study progressed the following objectives were added
onto the initial goal.  The first objective was to perform a
quantitative assessment of the risk to the public from reactor
accidents. This required analyses directed toward determining
both the probabilities and the consequences of such accidents.
The  second  objective  was  to  perform  a  more  realistic
assessment as opposed to the "conservatively-oriented" safety
approach taken in previous studies of this type and the
licensing process  for nuclear power plants.  The third
objective was to develop the methodological approaches needed
to perform these assessments and gain an understanding of
their limitations.  The fourth objective was to identify areas
in which future safety research might be fruitfully directed.
The last objective was to provide an independent check of the
effectiveness of the reactor safety practices of industry and
the government.
The result of the study was that the risks to the public
from the potential accidents in the nuclear power plants are
comparatively small.  The basis for this was twofold. The
first basis was that the possible consequences of potential
reactor accidents were predicted to be no larger, and in many
cases much smaller, than those of non-nuclear accidents.  The
consequences were  predicted to be smaller than people have5 
been led to believe by previous studies which deliberately
maximized estimates of  these consequences.  The second basis
was that the likelihood of reactor accidents was much smaller
than that  of  many non-nuclear accidents  having  similar
consequences.  All non-nuclear accidents examined in the
study, including fires, explosions, toxic chemical releases,
dam failures, airplane crashes, earthquakes, hurricanes and
tornadoes,  were much more likely to occur and can have
consequences comparable to, or larger than, those of nuclear
accidents.
The prevailing method of risk assessment in 1972 was to
always assume the maximum value for any event and use that as
a "conservative" estimate in performing any calculations.
This resulted in a higher potential of accidents but of course
was not the true risk assessment as we know it now.
The component failure rates for this study were determined
by utilizing the failure rate data from fossil fueled plants,
chemical plants and the petroleum industry.  This method was
utilized because the experience of a few hundred reactor years
was deemed not sufficient by itself to provide statistically
meaningful probabilities for most of the required component
failure rates.  Since certain components of nuclear systems
may be subjected to rather unique environments such as high
temperature steam and radiation, specialists were used to
assess the effects of these harsh environments. The component6 
failure  rates  and  their  associated  uncertainties  were
increased accordingly based on their assessment for the
extreme environments.
The study was considered a great success for a study which
was performed for the first time.  This study would be the
birth  of  probabilistic  risk  assessment  in  the  nuclear
industry.
A guide to the performance of PRA (NUREG/CR-2300)
The PRA Procedures Guide2  was published in 1982.  It was
commissioned by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission  (NRC),
Department of Energy (DOE) and the Electric Power Research
Institute (EPRI), and expertise was contributed by the nuclear
industry. The Steering Committee responsible for the document
included representatives from the American Nuclear Society
(ANS), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE),  the  Nuclear  Regulatory  Commission  (NRC),  the
Department of Energy (DOE), the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF),
the Electric Power Research Institute  (EPRI)  and several
utilities.
The primary goal of the project was to compile a procedures
guide  describing  the  principal  methods  now  used  in
probabilistic risk assessment.  The Steering Committee set
forth five guidelines to meet this goal.  The first guideline
was that although the procedures in whole or in part may have
wider application, the thrust of the Guide would be toward7 
performing probabilistic risk assessments of light-water­
reactor nuclear power plants.  The second guideline was that
the procedures would be suitable for use by the nuclear
industry.  This  implies,  among  other  things,  that  the
techniques described would not require the use of expertise,
computer codes,  or methods not readily available to the
nuclear industry or its contractors.  The third guideline was
that  the  procedures would  be  suitable  for  use  in  the
regulatory process. The guide would contain sufficient detail
for the information base, analytical methods, assumptions,
uncertainties, and results to be readily understandable.  The
fourth guideline was that the Guide would be in sufficient
detail to be suitable for use by small teams of persons with
a firm grasp of engineering principles, probabilistic methods,
and the design and operation of LWR nuclear power plants.  The
last guideline was that the Guide would, where appropriate,
provide major alternative procedures or methods and, in doing
so,  describe the different applications,  advantages,  and
disadvantages of the alternatives.
When compared to the goals of the WASH-1400 study the
differences are immense.  It is easy to see that by now the
industry has adopted this method to be the future tool of
gauging the safety of each nuclear power plant.  The goals
specifically mention  the use  of  these procedures  as  a
regulatory process.  Where there were many doubts about
probabilistic risk assessment in WASH-1400, these doubts are8 
very small for the NUREG/CR-2300.  In stating that the guide
must be functional for a small group of engineers at a nuclear
power plant the Steering Committee makes it very clear that
the Guide must be practical.
The  component  failure  rate  estimation  is  very  well
documented in the guide.  The major sources of component
failure rate data are studies performed by various research
institutes and Licensee Event Reports at U. S. Nuclear Power
Plants.  The study specifically states that "At present, no
nuclear plant keeps records of component reliability for the
specific purpose of using them as data for risk assessment."2
But the guide also cites several potential plant specific data
sources such as periodic test reports, maintenance reports,
periodic test procedures, operational procedures and control
room logs.
The guide also goes on to discuss the point estimation of
the component failure rates.  The estimation of binomial
distributions,  Poisson  distributions  and  log-normal
distributions are discussed.  All  of these are estimated
utilizing the maximum likelihood estimators which are in all
cases the classical number of failures divided by the time
interval.  Even though the industry is making large steps at
this point to utilize the probabilistic risk assessment
method,  the crux of the entire assessment which is the
component failure rate estimation is performed using the
classical estimation.9 
PSA Procedure Guide (NUREG/CR-2815)
The PSA Procedure Guide was published in 1985 by Brookhaven
National  laboratories.  This  guide basically takes  the
NUREG/CR-2300 guide one step further in its applications.  In
order to prevent undue focus on the bottom line results of
probabilistic risk assessment and to emphasize the program's
responsiveness to current safety issues, the name "PRA" was
replaced with "Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA)".
The scope of the guide includes internal initiating events
and accidents initiated only from full power operations.  The
scope does not presume detailed mechanistic analysis of plant
behavior and considers initiating events due to natural and
energetic phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, fires,
floods, explosions, etc.  Also it does not cover analysis of
in-plant and ex-plant physical phenomena resulting from a core
damage  event.  In addition to the events  selected for
evaluation in WASH-1400, this program recognized that some
additional events should be evaluated. For initiating events,
system and component failure rate data,  information was
provided on the use of generic and plant specific data in the
evaluation of the probability of accident sequences. Also
physical processes which may affect accident delineation were
recognized.  The assumptions to be used for incorporating
physical phenomena which may contribute to core damage were
provided.  For analysis of system interactions, approaches to
incorporating systems interactions in the studies were given.10 
Also uncertainty, sensitivity and importance analyses were
identified as required ingredients of the probabilistic safety
assessment  studies.  Also  the  scope  stated that  the
performers of a probabilistic safety assessment should report
specific products of their studies, to facilitate their own
further  utilization of their work, and to allow comparison
and evaluation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and other
reviewers.
It is evident that the guide was geared towards several
practical uses  of  the  assessment.  The  scope mentions
uncertainty, sensitivity and importance analyses which were
not mentioned in previous studies.  It also starts to raise
the question of cost benefits and design changes based on the
assessment performed on a power plant.  Combined with the
importance table, the assessment can now show each utility how
to spend its available dollars most effectively to reduce
risks.  This is quite an evolution from the WASH-1400 study
which was performed only 10 years ago.
The component failure rate determination is now a choice
between plant specific data or generic data.  The component
failure rate data sources are now broader and diverse in this
study.  The sources for plant specific data are as follows,
design drawings such as P&ID's, process drawings, electrical
drawings,  fire  zone drawings,  operating records such as
operator (control room) logs, monthly status reports, licensee
event reports, plant system specifications such as system11 
identification list,  system operability matrix,  equipment
records such as equipment lists, parts lists, maintenance
records such as maintenance logs, maintenance work requests,
maintenance  requests,  job  orders,  test records  such  as
periodic test reports,  plant test procedures, plant test
schedule,  master  surveillance  schedule  and  calibration
records.
This is a large improvement from the NUREG/CR-2300 guides
because now the plants have an option to use either the
generic data bases or the plant specific data bases which they
can develop on their own.
The component failure rate determination process for using
plant specific data bases is described in a step by step
procedure in this guide.  The steps are as follows.
A) Identify the component population whose failure history
is to be used to estimate the assumed common component
failure rate.
B) Identify the time period during which the component
failures are to be counted.
C) In the component population, count the total number of
failures and the total component standby time T for the
time period.
D) Estimate the plant-specific mean failure rate as
L = N / T
This is the mean of the posterior distribution when the
failure rate is treated as a random variable and when a12 
noninformative prior distribution is used.  This
estimate is also the usual classical statistics estimate
obtained under a Poisson model (maximum likelihood
estimate).
The guide also continues to list a generic component
failure rate table to be used if the plant specific data
sources are insufficient.  The table comes with the following
warning of its shortcomings.  "In all likelihood, modification
of this table will be necessary from time to time, both
because of new insights gained from operational experience and
because of difficulties encountered in applying the table.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will periodically review the
need for modification of the table. j313 
GOALS OF THIS STUDY
The  first  goal  was  to  select  three  to  five
equipment/systems and obtain failure rate data from Trojan
specific data or Nuclear Power Reactor Data System (NPRDS)
from INPO utilizing both methods.  The next goal was to
compare the two results and possibly determine a threshold
failure rate which would indicate that the equipment/system
should be replaced.  The  last goal was to compare the
resulting  overall  core  melt  frequencies  utilizing  both
methods.14 
PROCESS OF THE STUDY
Portland General Electric and Oregon State University
agreed to examine three equipment/systems:  motor operated
valves,  service  water  pump/motors  and  emergency  diesel
generator air chargers.  The motor operated valves were chosen
because they are used extensively in nuclear power plants
which means there should be a large amount of data to perform
the study.  The service water pump/motor and the emergency
diesel generator air charger were chosen because, though less
numerous they should be a good comparison against the motor
operated valves.  All of these components are vital to plant
operations.
The data source was chosen to be the Nuclear Power
Reactor Data System from the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations data base because the number of failures was
insufficient in the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant specific data
base. The disadvantage in doing so is that the Nuclear Power
Reactor Data System data base is comprised of data from all
over the country and so the reporting format for each plant
would be different even though the Nuclear Power Reactor Data
System does set certain guidelines for reporting failures.
Same failures could be viewed differently by different plants
making the failures different in the Nuclear Power Reactor15 
Data System.  Also some plants have gone back to their old
files and reported failures before the Nuclear Power Reactor
Data System existed and some have not.
The component age was selected as one of the query fields.
Under this field the assumption is that a component is
considered new when the component is replaced only.  If the
component was refurbished or repaired it would not constitute
a new component.  In the case of the motor operated valves,
the failures which were in the data base did not include
common cause failures.
Common  cause  failures  are  the  failures  of  multiple
components or systems due to  a  single secondary event.
Elimination of common cause failures and improvement of
designs against common cause failures are a major objective of
much of the reliability and risk analyses in the nuclear power
industry.  The common cause failure rates are no longer
independent of each other.  REBECA5, which is the computer
code chosen to analyze the risk,  calculates common cause
failure rates utilizing the Multiple Greek Letter method.  For
example  if there are four components with an individual
failure rate of Pim the failure rates are as follows.
P2.= (1/3) * B * (1-R) *  Pmd 
P3= (1/3) * B * R * (1-D) * Pind
P4= B * R * D * Pind
where
P2  :  Probability of 2 out of 4 components failing16 
P3  : Probability of 3 out of 4 components failing
P4  : Probability of 4 out of 4 components failing
B : Conditional probability that the cause of a component
failure will be shared by one or more additional
components, given that a specific component has
failed
R  =  ( 1 + B )  / 2
D  =  ( 1 + R )  / 2
So the common cause failure rate would change when the
basic motor operated valve failure rate changes.
The entire data base was screened to ensure that the
failures which were reported were indeed failures in the
probabilistic risk assessment sense.  Although there were
times when the report was either too brief or cryptic, for
each entry the best judgement was used to decide whether to
use the data or not.  This was the most time consuming portion
of the study.
The spreadsheet Quattro Pro was used to evaluate the
data.  The first step was to sort the data in an ascending
order by time of failure.  Then the failure rate utilizing the
conventional method was calculated for each time.  These
values were then averaged to arrive at an overall total
failure rate for each component. The result of this step is
shown in Table 1.17 
Table  1. Total failure rates (failures / hr)
using the conventional method
Average  Standard Deviation
Motor Oper. Valves  0.051 0.017
Service Water Pumps  0.011  0.015
EDG Air Chargers  0.011  0.018
The standard deviation for the motor operated valves is
33 % of the average compared to 136 % for the service water
pump/motors and 164 % for the emergency diesel generator air
charger.  This is a direct result from the fact that there
were 6272 motor operated valve failures compared to 1215 for
service water pumps and 1171 for EDG air chargers.  This is
not to be confused with the bathtub curve, which will be
discussed later, having a large standard deviation because
this is the total failure rate not the failure per unit time.
So the numbers for the service water pump/motors and emergency
diesel generator air charger are not as convincing as the
motor operated valves.  To further see the differences from
this,  a  95  %  confidence interval for the averages were
constructed for the three elements.  The results of this are
shown in Table 2.18
Table 2. 95 % Confidence intervals
for the averages
Lower Bound  Average  Upper Bound
Motor Oper.
Valves  0.0508  0.0512  0.0516
Service Water
Pumps  0.0097  0.0105  0.0113
EDG Air
Chargers  0.0103  0.0113  0.0123
As expected the confidence intervals for the motor
operated valves are much smaller due to the large amount of
data.  This  indicates data which  is more reliable and
dependable.
The numbers discussed above concern the total failures.
In Table 3 the final component failure rate is shown when the
number of plants and the number of components per plant are
taken into consideration.19 
Table 3. Component failure rate (failures / hr)
using the conventional method
Average  Standard Deviation
Motor Oper. Valves  1.85 E-6  1.7 E-6
Service Water Pumps  4.68 E-5  6.57 E-5
EDG Air Charger  5.04  E-5  7.91 E-5
These numbers are much smaller than the numbers which
were used by Portland General Electric in their individual
plant examination study shown in Table 4 even though they are
the sum of all the separate categories of failure which
Portland General Electric utilizes.  There are a number of
reasons behind this.  The most significant reason is that as
discussed before the reporting format and decision making in
reporting the failure itself were made by individual plants.20 
Table 4. Generic Component Failure Rates (failures / hr)
Utilized in PGE's IPE
Failure Type  Failure Rate  Source
Plugged or Fouled  1 E-7  NUREG/CR-45506
Leak or Rupture  1 E-7  PSA Proc. Guide
Fail to Operate  1.25 E-4  NUREG/CR-4550
Actuates and Deactivates  5 E-8  NUCLARR4
Spuriously
00S for Maintenance  3.33 E-5  NUREG/CR-4550
Fail to Close on Demand  1.25 E-4  NUREG/CR-4550
Fail to Remain Closed  1 E-7  PSA Proc. Guide
Fail to Open on Demand  1.25 E-4  NUREG/CR-4550
Fail to Remain Opened  2 E-7  PSA Proc. Guide
Sum  4 E-4
In Figure 1 the total failures were plotted versus time
to evaluate the possibility of reliability growth.  All three
components have a definite tailing off at approximately 150
thousand hours indicating reliability growth.7000 
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The curves  in Figure  1  were first fit to a parabola
utilizing a power of 0.8.  The curves were then adjusted by
adding a factor to the third power.  This fit resulted in the
largest values for coefficients of determination compared to
other fits.  The values for coefficients of determination are
shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Coefficients of Determinations
Coefficient of Determination
Motor Operated Valves  0.9949
Service Water Pumps  0.9927
EDG Air Chargers  0.9917
The coefficients shown Table 5 indicate a good fit.  The
curves were then plotted against the fit curves.  This is
shown in Figures 2,3 and 4.  These Figures reiterate the good
fit shown in Table 5.  The actual coefficients for the fit
are shown in Table 6.  The equation for the parabola is
Y = A * t"  B * t30  50000  100000  150000  200000  250000 
TIME ( HRS ) 
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Table 6. Coefficients for fit curves
A B
Motor Oper. Valves  0.48718  -2.51 E-13
Service Water Pumps  0.0079877  -9.56 E-15
EDG Air Charger  0.094858  -5.85 E-14
After this the component failure rate was calculated
utilizing the reliability growth method.  As previously
discussed the reliability growth method introduces a time
dependency to the component failure rate.  Since an arbitrary
time could not be assumed, for the sake of comparison the
component failure rate which was calculated utilizing the
reliability growth method was averaged over the component life
time.  The results are shown in Table 7.
Table 7. Component failure rate (failure / hr)
utilizing the reliability growth method
Average  Standard Deviation
Motor Oper. Valves  1.53  E-6  1.43  E-6
Service Water Pumps  3.33  E-5  1.41 E-5
EDG Air Charger  3.68  E-5  1.89  E-527 
The component failure rate for the motor operated valves
utilizing the reliability growth method is  82  %  of the
component failure rate when utilizing the conventional method.
The numbers for service water pumps are 29 % smaller and for
the EDG air chargers the numbers are 27 % smaller.  Another
interesting point is that the standard deviations for the
service water pumps and the EDG air chargers are smaller than
the conventional method.  This really does not have a lot of
meaning because in those two cases the reliability growth
method would utilize the time dependent value instead of the
values shown.  It would be possible to utilize the averaged
value shown in Table 7 for the motor operated valves because
of the sheer number of them in a nuclear power plant.
In reliability mathematics there  is  a configuration
called the  'bath tub curve'.  This curve occurs typically
when the number of failures versus time is plotted.  The name
comes from the shape of the curve which is shown in Figure 5.
The first region shows a high number of failures and is called
the infant mortality region. This is due to the breaking in of
the component.  The second region is the flat middle region
where now the component is operating with little numbers of
failures.  The last region is where the number of failures
begin to increase again due to the age of the component. If
the data that was used in this study showed the same28 
configuration, a threshold failure rate could be determined as
a point when the component should be replaced to avoid the
third region of the curve.60 
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The failures were then plotted against time.  As shown in
Figures 6,7, and 8 this was not the case.  Although these
curves are not smooth it still shows the decreasing number of
failures per additional time frame.  The number of failures
per additional time frame did not exhibit the increase at the
end of component life.  The reason for this  is that the
components have not reached their end of  life when the
failures  increase.  Consequently  it  was  impossible  to
determine a threshold failure rate which would indicate the
need to replace the component.
In Figure 9, the change in the component failure rates are
shown as a function of time for the motor operated valves.  As
expected the conventional method shows the smaller component
failure rate at the beginning of the component's life.  But
shortly after that the reliability growth method exhibits the
smaller component failure rate.35 
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The next step was to calculate the effect that this
smaller component failure rate would have on Trojan's core
melt  frequency.  Thiswas  performed  by  utilizing  the
importance table generated from REBECA to calculate the
overall effect of the new component failure rate generated by
the reliability growth method. The importance table lists the
major contributors to Trojan's core melt frequency in order of
importance.  This table lists each event and its probability.
The approach taken was to decrease the probabilities of those
events which contained the three components which were used in
this study by the amount found when utilizing the reliability
growth method.  It turns out that the EDG air chargers were
not included in the top 286 important events and the service
water pumps barely made the list.  So the major contributor
amongst the three components were the motor operated valves.
This assumes that the data used to perform the initial generic
component failure rates in studies such as PSA procedure guide
or NUREG/CR-4550 will show approximately the same amount of
decrease if the reliability growth method is applied to the
data.
Out of the 286 most important events,  42 events were
failures which directly involved motor operated valves.  The
total probability of these events was 9.8  %.  Since the
importance table is calculated so that the values denote the
overall probability that each event contributes to the overall
core melt frequency,  it  is possible to ratio the motor36 
operated valve values to see what effect that the reliability
growth method has on the overall core melt frequency of Trojan
Nuclear Power Plant.  Decreasing the motor operated valve
failure rate value by 82 % of its original value results in an
overall percentage of 8.0 %.  The overall decrease in Trojan's
core melt frequency would be approximately 1.8 % by utilizing
the reliability growth method on the motor operated valves
alone.
Sensitivity studies were performed on the system fault tree
level utilizing the REBECA computer code.  The basic event
data file for Portland General Electric's risk assessment was
modified for the reliability growth method by decreasing the
motor operated valve component failure rates by 20 %.  Since
REBECA utilizes the Multiple Greek Letter method, the common
cause  failure  rates  decreased  accordingly  as  discussed
previously. A summary of the corrections made to the original
basic event data base can be found in the Appendix A.  The
sensitivity study was performed on the auxiliary feed water
system, chemical volume and control system, residual heat
removal system and safety injection systems.
When performing a fault tree level sensitivity there are
two important parameters which must be defined.  The flag set
is the first parameter.  This parameter defines the sequence
of events to be used while performing the sensitivity study.
For example the flow path in the reactor plant for a residual
heat removal system in injection mode will be different from37 
that of a residual heat removal system in recirculation mode.
Also the safety injection system operates in an entirely
different manner when there is a loss of all AC when compared
to a loss of coolant accident.  In essence the flag set
defines the environment or accident mode of the power plant to
be evaluated.  The flag set defines the basic sequence of
events used to perform the sensitivity study.  The second
parameter which must be defined is the culling limit.  This
parameter defines the lowest value of probability to be
considered in the study.  For example if the culling limit is
set at 1E-06, the program will consider only the events which
have a probability equal to or larger than 1E-06.  This
parameter determines how thorough the study will be.
Several different flag sets and culling limits were utilized
in this phase of the study to ensure that the reduction in the
system fault tree top event probability was not due to
anything else.  The meanings of the different flag sets are in
the Appendix B.
A total of 58 different combinations were analyzed and
compared to the Portland General Electric's results in the
Appendix C.  The least amount of reduction in the overall core
melt frequency for the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant was for the
case where the fault tree which was analyzed contained no
motor operated valves.  The most amount of reduction was in
the chemical volume and control system during a small and very38 
small loss of coolant accident during the recirculation phase.
The value utilizing the reliability growth method was 91.6% of
the conventional method.39 
CONCLUSION
The study was a success in the sense that it has shown
that reliability growth exists in the nuclear power field.
Also it was shown that utilizing this method will lower the
overall core melt frequency.  The core melt frequency was
lowered in the case of Trojan Nuclear Power Plant by 1.8 %
when utilizing the reliability growth method on the motor
operated valves alone.  The core melt frequency could be
lowered significantly by applying this method on other vital
components such as auxiliary feed pumps or safety injection
pumps.40 
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APPENDIX  A
CORRECTIONS MADE TO PGE'S BED FILE42 
LIST OF CORRECTIONS MADE TO BED FILE
EVENT ID  DESCRIPTION  NEW VALUE 
ACM04903A--P  MOV 4903A FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
ACM04903B--P  MOV 4903B FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
ACMOCC0001-P  COMMON CAUSE 4903A & 4903B  2.11E-04 
AFM02947A--P  MOV 2947A FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
AFM02947B--P  MOV 2947B FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
AFM03045A--P  MOV 3045A FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
AFM03045B--P  MOV 3045B FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
AFM03060B--P  MOV 3060B FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
AFM03071--P  MOV 3071 FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
AFM03071-1DQ  MOV 3071 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
AFM03170-1DQ  MOV 3170FT REM OPEN 24 MRS  1.60E-07 
AFMOCC0001-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004A,3004B,3004C  5.93E-05 
AFMOCC0002-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004A,3004B,3004D  5.93E-05 
AFMOCC0003-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004A,3004C,3004D  5.93E-05 
AFMOCC0004-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004B,3004C,3004D  5.93E-05 
AFMOCC0005-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004A,3004B  2.70E-05 
AFMOCC0006-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004A,3004C  2.70E-05 
AFMOCC0007-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004A,3004D  2.70E-05 
AFMOCC0008-P  COMMON CAUSE 30048,3004C  2.70E-05 
AFMOCC0009-P  COMMON CAUSE 30048,3004D  2.70E-05 
AFMOCC0010-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004C,3004D  2.70E-05 
AFMOCC0011-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004A,3004B,3004C  2.70E-05 
AFMOCC0012-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004A,3004B,3004D  5.93E-05 
AFMOCC0013-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004A,3004C,3004D  5.93E-05 43 
AFMOCC0015-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004A,3004B  2.70E-05 
AFMOCC0016-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004A,3004C  2.70E-05 
AFMOCC0017-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004A,3004D  2.70E-05 
AFMOCC0018-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004B,3004C  2.70E-05 
AFMOCC0019-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004B,3004D  2.70E-05 
AFMOCC0020-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004C,3004D  2.70E-05 
AFMOCC0021-P  COMMON CAUSE 2947A,2947B  2.70E-05 
AFMOCC0022-P  COMMON CAUSE 3045A,3045B  2.70E-05 
CCM03210A-P  MOV 3210A FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CCM03210A1DQ  MOV 3210A FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CCM03210B--P  MOV 3210B FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CCM03210B1DQ  MOV 32108 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CCM03290-1DQ  MOV 3290 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CCM03291-1DQ  MOV 3291 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CCMO3292 -1DQ  MOV 3292 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CCM03293--P  MOV 3293FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CCM03293-1DQ  MOV 3293 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CCM03294-1DQ  MOV 3294 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CCM03295-1DQ  MOV 3295 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CCMO3296 -1DQ  MOV 3296 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CCM03300-1DQ  MOV 3300 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CCM03319-1DQ  MOV 3319 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CCM03320-1DQ  MOV 3320 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CCM03346-1DQ  MOV 3346 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CCM03347--P  MOV 3347 FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CCMO3347 -1DQ  MOV 3347 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CCMOCC0001-P  COMMON CAUSE 3210A,3210B  1.14E-04 44 
CIM010009--N  MOV 10009 FT CLOSE ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CIM010010--N  MOV 10010 FT CLOSE ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CIMO10011 - -N  MOV 10011 FT CLOSE ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CIM010012--N  MOV 10012 FT CLOSE ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CIM04300---N  MOV 4300 FT CLOSE ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CIMOCC0001-N  COMMON CAUSE 10009,10010,10011  5.93E-05 
CIMOCC0002-N  COMMON CAUSE 10009,10010,10012  5.93E-05 
CIMOCC0003-N  COMMON CAUSE 10009,10010,4300  5.93E-05 
CIMOCC0004-N  COMMON CAUSE 10009,10011,10012  5.93E-05 
CIMOCC0005-N  COMMON CAUSE 10009,10011,4300  5.93E-05 
CIMOCC0006-N  COMMON CAUSE 10009,10012,4300  5.93E-05 
CIMOCC0007-N  COMMON CAUSE 10010,10011,10012  5.93E-05 
CIMOCC0008-N  COMMON CAUSE 10010,10011,4300  5.93E-05 
CIMOCC0009-N  COMMON CAUSE 10010,10012,4300  5.93E-05 
CIMOCC0010-N  COMMON CAUSE 10011,10012,4300  5.93E-05 
CIMOCC0011-N  COMMON CAUSE 10009,10010  2.70E-05 
CIMOCC0012-N  COMMON CAUSE 10009,10011  2.70E-05 
CIMOCC0013-N  COMMON CAUSE 10009,10012  2.70E-05 
CIMOCC0014-N  COMMON CAUSE 10009,4300  2.70E-05 
CIMOCC0015-N  COMMON CAUSE 10010,10011  2.70E-05 
CIMOCC0016-N  COMMON CAUSE 10010,10012  2.70E-05 
CIMOCC0017-N  COMMON CAUSE 10010,4300  2.70E-05 
CIMOCC0018-N  COMMON CAUSE 10011,10012  2.70E-05 
CIMOCC0019-N  COMMON CAUSE 10011,4300  2.70E-05 
CIMOCC0020-N  COMMON CAUSE 10012,4300  2.70E-05 
CSM02050A1DQ  MOV 2050A FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CSM0205081DQ  MOV 2050B FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 45 
CSM02053B--P  MOV 2053B FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CSM02069A1D0  MOV 2069A FT REM CLOSED 24 HRS  8.00E-08 
CSM02069A1D0  MOV 2069A FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CSM02069B1D0  MOV 20698 FT REM CLOSED 24 HRS  8.00E-08 
CSM02069B1DQ  MOV 2069B FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CCMOCC0001-P  COMMON CAUSE 2053A,2053B  1.14E-04 
CVM0112B---N  MOV 112B FT CLOSE ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CVM0112B-1D0  MOV 112B REM CLOSED 24 HRS  8.00E-08 
CVM0112C--N  MOV 112C FT CLOSE ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CVM0112C-1D0  MOV 112C FT REM CLOSED 24 MRS  8.00E-08 
CVM0112D---P  MOV 112D FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CVM0112D-1DQ  MOV 112D FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CVM0112E---P  MOV 112E FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CVM0112E-1100  MOV 112E FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CVM08104---P  MOV 8104 FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CVM08104-1DQ  MOV 8104 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CVM08105---N  MOV 8105 FT CLOSE ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CVM08105---P  MOV 8105 FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CVM08105-1D0  MOV 8105 FT REM CLOSED 24 HRS  8.00E-08 
CVM08105-1DQ  MOV 8105 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CVM08106---N  MOV 8106 FT CLOSE ON DEM  2.40-E03 
CVM08106---P  MOV 8106 FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CVM08106-1D0  MOV 8106 FT REM CLOSED 24 HRS  8.00E-08 
CVM08106-1DQ  MOV 8106 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CVM08801A--P  MOV 8801A FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CVM08801A1DQ  MOV 8801A FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CVM08801B--P  MOV 8801B FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 46 
CVM08803A--P  MOV 8803A FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CVM08803A1DQ  MOV 8803A FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CVM08803B--P  MOV 8803B FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CVM08803B1DQ  MOV 8803B FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
CVMOCC0001-N  COMMON CAUSE 112B,112C,8105  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0001-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,112E,8104  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0002-N  COMMON CAUSE 112B,112C,8106  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0002-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,112E,8105  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0003-N  COMMON CAUSE 112B,8105,8106  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0003-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,112E,8106  5.90E-05 
CVMOCC0004-N  COMMON CAUSE 112C,8105,8106  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0004-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,112E,8801A  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0005-N  COMMON CAUSE 112B,112C  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0005-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,112E,8801B  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0006-N  COMMON CAUSE 112B,8105  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0006-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,8104,8105  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0007-N  COMMON CAUSE 112B,8106  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0007-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,8104,8106  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0008-N  COMMON CAUSE 112C,8105  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0008-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,8104,8801A  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0009-N  COMMON CAUSE 112C,8106  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0009-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,8104,8801B  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0010-N  COMMON CAUSE 8105,8106  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0010-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,8105,8106  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0011-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,8105,8801A  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0012-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,8105,8801B  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0013-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,8106,8801A  5.93E-05 47 
CVMOCC0015-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,8801A,8801B  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0016-P  COMMON CAUSE 112E,8104,8105  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0017-P  COMMON CAUSE 112E,8104,8106  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0018-P  COMMON CAUSE 112E,8104,8801A  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0019-P  COMMON CAUSE 112E,8104,8801B  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0020-P  COMMON CAUSE 112E,8105,8106  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0021-P  COMMON CAUSE 112E,8105,8801A  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0022-P  COMMON CAUSE 112E,8105,8801B  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0023-P  COMMON CAUSE 112E,8106,8801A  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0024-P  COMMON CAUSE 112E,8106,8801B  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0025-P  COMMON CAUSE 112E,8801A,8801B  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0026-P  COMMON CAUSE 8104,8105,8106  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0027-P  COMMON CAUSE 8104,8105,8801A  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0028-P  COMMON CAUSE 8104,8105,8801B  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0029-P  COMMON CAUSE 8104,9106,8801A  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0030-P  COMMON CAUSE 8104,8106,8801B  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0031-P  COMMON CAUSE 8104,8801A,8801B  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0032-P  COMMON CAUSE 8105,8106,8801A  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0033-P  COMMON CAUSE 8105,8106,8801B  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0034-P  COMMON CAUSE 8105,8801A,8801B  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0035-P  COMMON CAUSE 8106,8801A,8801B  5.93E-05 
CVMOCC0036-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,112E  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0037-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,8104  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0038-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,8105  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0039-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,8106  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0040-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,8801A  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0041-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,8801B  2.70E-05 48 
CVMOCC0043-P  COMMON CAUSE 112E,8105  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0044-P  COMMON CAUSE 112E,8106  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0045-P  COMMON CAUSE 112E,8801A  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0046-P  COMMON CAUSE 112E,8801B  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0047-P  COMMON CAUSE 8104,8105  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0048-P  COMMON CAUSE 8104,8106  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0049-P  COMMON CAUSE 8104,8801A  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0050-P  COMMON CAUSE 8104,8801B  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0051-P  COMMON CAUSE 8105,8106  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0052-P  COMMON CAUSE 8105,8801A  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0053-P  COMMON CAUSE 8105,8801B  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0054-P  COMMON CAUSE 8106,8801A  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0055-P  COMMON CAUSE 8106,8801B  2.70E-05 
CVMOCC0056-P  COMMON CAUSE 8801A,8801B  2.70E-05 
CWM03441---P  MOV 3441 FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CWM03442---P  MOV 3442 FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CWM03443---P  MOV 3443 FT OPEN ON DEM  2.40E-03 
CWMOCC0001-P  COMMON CAUSE 3441,3442,3443  5.93E-05 
CWMOCC0002-P  COMMON CAUSE 3441,3442  2.70E-05 
CWMOCC0003-P  COMMON CAUSE 3441,3443  2.70E-05 
CWMOCC0004-P  COMMON CAUSE 3442,3443  2.70E-05 
MFM02997A1DQ  MOV 2997A FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
MFM02997B1DQ  MOV 2997B FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
MFM02998A1DQ  MOV 2998A FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
MFMO2998B1DQ  MOV 2998B FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
MFMO7100A1DQ  MOV 7100A FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 
MFMO7100B1DQ  MOV 7100B FT REM OPEN 24 HRS  1.60E-07 49 
RHM08701---P  MOV 8701 FT OPEN ON DEM 
RHM08702---P  MOV 8702 FT OPEN ON DEM 
RHM08716A--N  MOV 8716A FT CLOSE ON DEM 
RHM08716A1DQ  MOV 8716A FT REM OPEN 24 HRS 
RHM08716B--N  MOV 8716B FT CLOSE ON DEM 
RHM08716B1DQ  MOV 8716B FT REM OPEN 24 HRS 
RHM08804A--P  MOV 8804A FT OPEN ON DEM 
RHM08804A1D0  MOV 8804A FT REM CLOSED 24 HRS 
RHM08804B--P  MOV 8804B FT OPEN ON DEM 
RHM08804B1D0  MOV 8804B FT REM CLOSED 24 HRS 
RHM08809A1DQ  MOV 8809A FT REM OPEN 24 HRS 
RHM08809B1DQ  MOV 8809B FT REM OPEN 24 HRS 
RHM08811A--P  MOV 8811A FT OPEN ON DEM 
RHM08811A1D0  MOV 8811A FT REM CLOSED 24 HRS 
RHM08811B--P  MOV 8811B FT OPEN ON DEM 
RHM08811B1D0  MOV 8811B FT REM CLOSED 24 HRS 
RHM08812---N  MOV 8812 FT CLOSE ON DEM 
RHM08812-1DQ  MOV FT REM OOPEN 24 HRS 
RHMOCC0001-N  COMMON CAUSE 8700A,87008,8716A 
RHMOCC0001-P  COMMON CAUSE 610,611 
RHMOCC0002-N  COMMON CAUSE 8700B,8700A,8716B 
RHMOCC0002-P  COMMON CAUSE 8701,8702 
RHMOCC0003-N  COMMON CAUSE 8700A,8716A,8716B 
RHMOCC0003-P  COMMON CAUSE 8811A,8811B 
RHMOCC0004-N  COMMON CAUSE 8700B,8716A,8716B 
RHMOCC0004-P  COMMON CAUSE 8804A,8804B 
RHMOCC0005-N  COMMON CAUSE 8700A,8700B 
2.40E-03
2.40E-03
2.40E-03
1.60E-07
2.40E-03
1.60E-07
2.40E-03
8.00E-08
2.40E-03
8.00E-08
1.60E-07
1.60E-07
2.40E-03
8.00E-08
2.40E-03
8.00E-08
2.40E-03
1.60E-07
5.93E-05
1.14E-04
5.93E-05
1.14E-04
5.93E-05
1.14E-04
5.93E-05
1.14E-04
2.70E-0550 
RHMOCC0007-N COMMON CAUSE 8700A,87168
RHMOCC0008-N COMMON CAUSE 8700B,8716A
RHMOCC0009-N COMMON CAUSE 8700B,8716B
RHMOCC0010-N COMMON CAUSE 8716A,8716B
SIM08802A--P MOV 8802A FT OPEN ON DEM
SIM08802A1DQ MOV 8802A FT REM OPEN 24 HRS
SIM08802B--P MOV 8802B FT OPEN ON DEM
SIM08802B1DQ MOV 8802B FT REM OPEN 24 HRS
SIM08806---N MOV 8806FT CLOSE ON DEM
SIM08806 -1DQ MOV 8806 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS
SIM08807A--P MOV 8807A FT OPEN ON DEM
SIM08807A1DQ MOV 8807A FT REM OPEN 24 HRS
SIM08807B--P MOV 8807BFT OPEN ON DEM
SIM08807B1DQ MOV 8807B FT REM OPEN 24 HRS
SIM08821A1DQ MOV 8821A FT REM OPEN 24 HRS
SIM08821B1DQ MOV 8821B FT REM OPEN 24 HRS
SIM08835-1DQ MOV 8835 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS
SIM08923A--N MOV 8923A FT CLOSE ON DEM
SIM08923A1DQ MOV 8923A FT REM OPEN 24 HRS
SIM08923B--N MOV 8923B FT CLOSE ON DEM
SIM08923B1DQ MOV 8923B FT REM OPEN 24 HRS
SIM08924 -1DQ MOV 8924 FT REM OPEN 24 HRS
SIMOCC0001-N COMMON CAUSE 8923A,8923B
SIMOCC0001-P COMMON CAUSE 8802A,8802B
SIMOCC0002-P COMMON CAUSE 8807A,8807B
RCM08000A--P MOV 8000A FT OPEN ON DEM
RCM08000B--N MOV 8000B FT CLOSE ON DEM
2.70E-05
2.70E-05
2.70E-05
2.70E-05
2.40E-03
1.60E-07
2.40E-03
1.60E-07
2.40E-03
1.60E-07
2.40E-03
1.60E-07
2.40E-03
1.60E-07
1.60E-07
1.60E-07
1.60E-07
2.40E-03
1.60E-07
2.40E-03
1.60E-07
1.60E-07
1.14E-04
1.14E-04
1.14E-04
2.40E-03
2.40E-0351 
RCMOCC0001-N  COMMON CAUSE 80000A,8000B 
RHM01363A1D0  MOV 1363A FT REM CLOSED 24 HRS 
RHM01363B1D0  MOV 1363B FT REM CLOSED 24 HRS 
RHM02050A--P  MOV 2050A FT OPEN ON DEM 
RHM02050B--P  MOV 2050B FT CLOSE ON DEM 
RHM02052A--P  MOV 2052A FT OPEN ON DEM 
RHM02052B--P  MOV 2052B FT OPEN ON DEM 
RHM0610----P  MOV 610 FT OPEN ON DEM 
RHM0611----P  MOV 611 FT OPEN ON DEM 
RHM08700A--N  MOV 8700A FT CLOSE ON DEM 
RHM08700A1DQ  MOV 8700FT REM OPEN 24 HRS 
RHM08700B--N  MOV 8700B FT CLOSE ON DEM 
AFMOCC0014-P  COMMON CAUSE 3004B,3004C,3004D 
CCMOCC0002-P  COMMON CAUSE 3293,3347 
CSM02053A--P  MOV 2053A FT OPEN ON DEM 
CVM08801B1DQ  MOV 8801B FT REM OPEN 24 HRS 
CVMOCC0014-P  COMMON CAUSE 112D,8106,8801B 
CVM08000A--N  COMMON CAUSE 112E,8104 
RCM08000A--N  MOV 8000A FT CLOSE ON DEM 
RHMOCC0006-N  COMMON CAUSE 8700A,8716A 
RCM08000B--P  MOV 8000B FT OPEN ON DEM 
RHM08700B1DQ  MOV 8700B FT REM OPEN 24 HRS 
2.11E-04
8.00E-08
8.00E-08
2.40E-03
2.40E-03
2.40E-03
2.40E-03
2.40E-03
2.40E-03
2.40E-03
1.60E-07
2.40E-03
5.93E-05
1.14E-04
2.40E-03
1.60E-07
5.93E-05
2.70E-05
2.40E-03
2.70E-05
2.40E-05
1.60E-0752 
APPENDIX  B
FLAG SETS TYPE AND DESCRIPTION53 
NO LOOP
BLD & FEED
CS-REC
NO CS-REC
NLOOP-LOCA
B&F-REC-CS
BF-REC-NCS
ML-REC-NCS
SL&SSL-CS
SBO
SL&SSL
SL&SSL-REC
SDC
LOOP
LOOP-LOCA
MFLB
SGTR
LOP-REC-NS
LOP-BF-NCS
LOP-REC-CS
LOP-B&F-CS
ATWS
SP1-7
LOOP-B&F
LL-INJ
LL-REC
ML-INJ
ML-REC
ALL FALSE
FLAG SET NAME AND DESCRIPTION
No loss of offsite power
Bleed and feed condition
Recirculation phase-containment spray on
Recirculation phase-containment spray off
No loss of offsite power, LOCA
Bleed and feed condition,in recirculation with containment sprays on
Bleed and feed condition, in recirculation with containment spray off
Medium LOCA in recirculation with sprays off
Small or small-small LOCA, with containment sprays on
Station blackout (loss of all AC)
Small or small-small LOCA
Small or small-small LOCA in recirculation
Shutdown cooling
Loss of offsite power
Loss of offsite power with LOCA
Main feed or steamline break
Steam generator tube rupture
Loss of offsite power,in recirculation, no sprays
Loss of offsite power, in bleed and feed, no sprays
Loss of offsite power,in recirculation, sprays on
Loss of offsite power, in bleed and feed, with sprays on
Anticipated transient without scram
Special initiator flagsets
Loss of offsite power, in bleed and feed
Large LOCA, in the injection phase
Large LOCA, in the recirculation phase
Medium LOCA, in the injection phase
Medium LOCA, in the recirculation phase
No flagsets (no accidents; normal operations)54 
APPENDIX  C
REBECA RESULTS AND COMPARISON55 
REBECA RESULTS
SYS  TOP 
EVENT 
CULLING 
LIMIT 
FLAG SET  X=PGE'S 
RESULT 
Y=NEW 
RESULT 
X / Y 
AF  AF-01-02  1E-07  ALL FALSE  1.8E-04  1.76E-04  0.977 
AF  AF-02-01  1E-09  ALL FALSE  2.05E-04  2.01E-04  0.98 
AF  AF-01-02  1E-06  LOOP  1.99E-02  1.96E-02  0.985 
AF  AF-01-02  1E-07  NO LOOP  2.62E-04  2.57E-04  0.981 
AF  AF-01-02  1E-06  SBO  5.99E-03  5.88E-03  0.982 
AF  AF-01-02  1E-07  SGTR  2.62E-04  2.57E-04  0.981 
AF  AF-01-02  1E-07  SP1  2.99E-04  2.94E-04  0.983 
AF  AF-01-02  1E-07  SL&SSL  2.62E-04  2.57E-04  0.981 
AF  AF-01-03  1E-07  BLD&FEED  3.82E-02  3.82E-02  1.00 
AF  AF-01-03  1E-07  SP3  1.29E-01  1.29E-01  1.00 
AF  AF-01-04  1E-07  BLD&FEED  5.26E-02  5.26E-02  1.00 
AF  AF-01-04  1E-07  SP3  1.42E-01  1.42E-01  1.00 
AF  AF-01-07  1E-07  MFLB  2.56E-03  2.56E-03  1.00 
AF  AF-02-01  1E-07  ATWS  2.7E-04  2.65E-04  0.981 
CV  CV-01-01  1E-08  SL &SSL  1.92E-03  1.90E-03  0.990 
CV  CV-01-01  1E-09  NO CS-REC  8.47E-03  7.83E-03  0.924 
CV  CV-01-01  1E-09  CS-REC  8.66E-03  8.03E-03  0.927 
CV  CV-01-01  1E-08  SL &SSL -REC  8.47E-03  7.84E-03  0.926 
CV  CV-26-01  1E-09  ATWS  9.93E-03  9.91E-03  0.998 
CV  CV-01-01  1E-09  ATWS  1.44E-03  1.42E-03  0.986 
CV  CV-01-01  1E-09  SL &SSL  1.92E-03  1.90E-03  0.990 
CV  CV-01-01  1E-09  LL-INJ  3.12E-03  3.10E-03  0.993 
CV  CV-01-01  1E-09  LOOP-LOCA  1.85E-02  1.80E-02  0.973 
CV  CV-01-01  1E-09  SL &SSL -REC  8.47E-03  7.84E-03  0.926 56 
SYS 
CV 
TOP 
EVENT 
CV-24-02 
CULLING 
LIMIT 
1E-09 
FLAG SET 
SL &SSL­
REC 
X=PGE'SR 
ESULT 
7.40E-03 
Y=NEW 
RESULT 
6.78E-03 
X/Y 
0.916 
RHR 
RHR 
RHR 
RHR 
RH-01-04 
RH-01-04 
RH-01-06 
RH -01 -06 
1E-08 
1E-08 
1E-08 
1E-08 
LL-INJ 
LL-REC 
SDC 
SL &SSL­
REC 
2.48E-03 
9.43E-03 
2.45E-02 
4.92E-03 
2.48E-03 
9.41E-03 
2.32E-02 
4.60E-03 
1.00 
0.998 
0.947 
0.935 
RHR  RH-01-06  1E-09  RHR REC 
L2 
1.25E-02  1.23E-02  0.984 
RHR  RH-01-06  5E-08  LOPRHRECL 
2 
2.95E-02  2.86E-02  0.969 
SI  SI-01-04  5E-06  LOP-BF­
NCS 
1.18E-02  1.14E-02  0.966 
SI  SI-01-04  5E-07  BF-REC­
NCS 
9.39E-04  8.86E-04  0.943 
SI 
SI 
SI-01-04 
SI-01-04 
5E-07 
5E-06 
SP6 
LOP-B&F­
CS 
1.05E-03 
1.20E-02 
9.98E-04 
1.16E-02 
0.950 
0.967 
SI  SI-01-04  5E-07  B&F-REC­
CS 
1.14E-03  1.09E-03  0.956 
SI 
SI 
SI-01-04 
SI-01-04 
5E-07 
1E-09 
SP7 
BLD & 
FEED 
1.25E-03 
1.44E-05 
1.20E-03 
1.44E-05 
0.960 
1.00 
SI 
SI 
SI 
SI 
SI-01-02 
SI-01-04 
SI-01-02 
SI-01-04 
5E-06 
1E-08 
1E-08 
5E-06 
LOOP-LOCA 
SP3 
ML-REC 
LOP-REC­
NS 
7.34E-03 
2.47E-05 
1.19E-03 
1.17E-02 
7.18E-03 
2.45E-05 
1.13E-03 
1.13E-02 
0.978 
0.992 
0.950 
0.966 
SI  SI-01-04  5E-07  NO CS-REC  8.65E-04  8.11E-04  0.938 57 
SYS  TOP 
EVENT 
CULLING 
LIMIT 
FLAG SET  X=PGE'S 
VALUE 
Y=NEW 
VALUE 
X/Y 
SI  SI-15-01  1E-06  ML-REC-NCS  4.48E-03  4.28E-03  0.955 
SI  SI-01-03  1E-08  BLD & FEED  1.44E-05  1.44E-05  1.00 
SI  SI-01-02  1E-09  BLD & FEED  1.44E-05  1.44E-05  1.00 
SI  SI-01-01  1E-09  NO LOOP  3.58E-03  3.56E-03  0.994 
SI  SI-01-02  1E-09  NO LOOP  1.44E-05  1.44E-05  1.00 
SI  SI -01 -03  1E-08  SL&SSL-CS  1.20E-03  1.13E-03  0.942 
SI  SI-01-04  5E-07  SP5  1.18E-03  1.12E-03  0.949 
SI  SI-15-01  5E-06  LL-REC  4.68E-03  4.48E-03  0.957 
SI  SI-01-02  1E-07  ML-REC-NCS  9.70E-04  9.03E-04  0.931 
SI  SI-01-04  5E-06  LOP-REC-CS  1.19E-02  1.15E-02  0.966 
SI  SI-01-04  5E-08  CS-REC  1.18E-03  1.12E-03  0.949 
SI  SI-01-03  1E-08  SL &SSL -REC  1.00E-03  9.32E-04  0.932 
SI  SI-01-04  5E-07  SP4  9.79E-04  9.23E-04  0.943 
CV  CV-04-02  1E-09  LOOP-LOCA  1.71E-02  1.66E-02  0.971 
SI  SI-01-01  1E-08  ML-INJ  6.8E-03  6.78E-03  0.997 